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GREEK HISTORIOGRAPHY AND SLAV-MACEDONIAN 
NATIONAL IDENTITY
In his celebrated novel Η ζωή εν τάφω [Life in a tomb] (1954 edition), Greek 
author Stratis Myrivilis has the protagonist briefly stay in a village in the 
region of Macedonia during World War I. The peasants: 
…spoke a language understood both by Serbs and Bulgarians. The 
first they hate because they torment them and treat them as if they 
were Bulgarians; and they [also] hate the Bulgarians because they 
took their children to the war. Us [Greeks] they accept with some 
sympathetic curiosity, only because we are the genuine moral subjects 
of the…Ecumenical Patriarch.1
It is fair to assume that this encounter was with people that today most Greeks 
would have identified as Slav-Macedonians. The existence, formation and 
mutations of their national identity have posed an interpretative challenge 
to Greek scholars and proved a consistently controversial topic. Since the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) declared independence 
in September 1991, the name dispute has added a further layer of often 
emotional complexity to bilateral arguments and understandings of identity.2 
Over the past century, a mainstream narrative has emerged in Greek 
historiography concerning when and how Slav-Macedonian national 
1 Stratis Myrivilis, Η ζωή εν τάφω [Life in a tomb], Athens: Estia, n.d., p. 227; my 
translation. This passage is taken from the seventh and final 1954 edition. In the novel’s 
first edition, published in 1924, the above-cited passage is to be found in a version that 
is similar in essence but perhaps somewhat rougher in language. For a comparison, see 
Stratis Myrivilis, Η ζωή εν τάφω, Athens: Estia, 1924 Mytiline Edition, p. 104.
2 The term FYROM will be used in this essay. It is the state’s international United 
Nations name according to United Nations Security Council Resolution 817 passed on 
7 April 1993. For examples of Greek academics and politicians addressing the name 
dispute, see Evangelos Kofos, “The Unresolved ‘Difference’ over the Name: A Greek 
Perspective”, in Evangelos Kofos and Vlassis Vlasidis (eds), Athens-Skopje: An Uneasy 
Symbiosis (1995-2002), Athens: ELIAMEP, 2005, pp. 125-223; id., “Greek Foreign Policy 
Considerations over FYROM Independence and Recognition”, in James Pettifer (ed.), 
The Historical Review / La Revue Historique
Institute for Neohellenic Research
Volume VIII (2011)
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identity evolved.3 Despite the inevitable disagreements and different points of 
emphasis, a sophisticated, broad approach strives to provide an explanatory 
framework to this vexing, from a Greek perspective, issue. It will be the 
purpose of this essay to present the key characteristics of this framework 
and elucidate how, in particular, the work of the Greek academic Dimitris 
Livanios and especially his recent exemplary and well-researched monograph 
significantly enriches certain aspects of it.4
In its sophisticated manifestations, Greek historiography begins with a pre-
national, pre-revolutionary era in Ottoman Macedonia applying to most of 
the Slavophone peasants. This state of affairs was based on the centrality of 
religious affiliation to Eastern Orthodoxy that permeated not only a common 
intellectual and theological landscape but also understandings of time and 
geography: “…time was defined by the ecclesiastical calendar…[while] the 
spatial horizon was defined by places of worship, great shrines of the faith 
and humble chapels”.5
The New Macedonian Question, London: Macmillan, 1999, pp. 243-244; Michalis 
Papakonstantinou, Το ημερολόγιο ενός πολιτικού [The diary of a politician], Athens: 
Estia, 1994; Aristotle Tziampiris, Διεθνείς σχέσεις και Μακεδονικό ζήτημα [International 
relations and the Macedonian Question], Athens: ELIAMEP, 2003; and id., Greece, 
European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question, Aldershot: Ashgate Press, 
2000.
3 For a superb example of sophisticated and mainstream modern Greek historiography, 
see John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis, Greece: The Modern Sequel: From 1831 
to the Present, London: Hurst and Company, 2002. It should also be kept in mind that 
mainstream Greek scholars consider the Slav-Macedonian national identity as only 
one of a multitude of identities that were present in the region that used to be Ottoman 
Macedonia. See, for example, Ioannis Stefanides, Vlassis Vlasidis and Evangelos Kofos 
(eds), Μακεδονικές ταυτότητες στο χρόνο. Διεπιστημονικές προσεγγίσεις [Macedonian 
identities in time: interdisciplinary approaches], Athens: Institute of the Museum of the 
Macedonian Struggle and Patakis, 2008.
4 This essay will focus on Dimitris Livanios, The Macedonian Question: Britain and the 
Southern Balkans, 1939-1949, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. To a lesser extent, 
two of his articles will also be taken into account: “The Quest for Hellenism: Religion, 
Nationalism and Collective Identities (1453-1913)”, The Historical Review / La Revue 
Historique III (2006), pp. 33-70, and “‘Conquering the Souls’: Nationalism and Greek 
Guerilla Warfare in Ottoman Macedonia, 1904-1908”, Byzantine and Modern Greek 
Studies XXIII (1999), pp. 195-221.
5 Paschalis M. Kitromilides, “‘Balkan Mentality’: History, Legend, Imagination”, 
Nations and Nationalism II/2 (1996), p. 177. See also id., An Orthodox Commonwealth: 
Symbolic Legacies and Cultural Encounters in Southeastern Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate 
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For Greek scholars, the prevalence of Christianity was not automatically 
swept away by the ideology of nationalism but remained over an extended 
period of time. For example, British journalist Henry Noel Brailsford, visiting 
Ottoman Macedonia at the beginning of the twentieth century, presented the 
following anecdote:
I questioned some boys from a remote mountain village near Ochrida, 
which had neither teacher nor resident priest, and where not a single 
inhabitant was able to read, in order to discover what amount of 
traditional knowledge they possessed. I took them up to the ruins of 
the Bulgarian Tsar’s fortress…“Who built this place?” I asked them. 
The answer was significant – “The Free Men.” “And who were they?” 
“Our grandfathers.” “Yes, but were they Serbs or Bulgarians, or 
Greeks or Turks?” “They weren’t Turks, they were Christians.” And 
this seemed to be about the measure of their knowledge.6
Livanios is in complete agreement with this understanding: “It quickly became 
apparent to the apostles of nationalism in Macedonia that the peasants could 
simply not understand the word ‘nation’.” 7 He offers the anecdote of a 
Greek patriot who asked some peasants in Macedonia if they were “Romaioi 
[Greeks] or Voulgaroi [Bulgarians]. They stared at me incomprehensibly…
and answered “Well, we are Christians, what do you mean by Romaioi or 
Voulgaroi?”8
There are two aspects to this Greek emphasis on the prolonged and 
widespread pre-national status of peasants in Ottoman Macedonia that 
should be stressed. First, it is indeed probable that it represents an entirely 
accurate depiction of realities on the ground, supported by a multitude of 
Press, 2007, and The Enlightenment as Social Criticism: Iosipos Moisiodax and Greek 
Culture in the Eighteenth Century, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. The work 
of Kitromilides is absolutely central to the understanding of the pre-national Balkans.
6 H. N. Brailsford, Macedonia: Its Races and their Future, London: Methuen and 
Company, 1906, pp. 99-100.
7 Livanios, The Macedonian Question, p. 9. In a similar manner he has previously argued 
that “The Macedonian peasantry simply refused to identify themselves with the ‘national’ 
causes of either Bulgaria or Greece.” (Livanios, “The Quest for Hellenism”, p. 66).
8 Ibid. However, it should not necessarily be discounted that in some instances 
Macedonian peasants might have engaged in dissimulation as a survival strategy. Livanios 
offers the following suggestive anecdote: “An elderly Slav told an English liaison officer in 
1944 that ‘we have had so many different masters that now, whoever comes along, we say 
(placing his hands together and smiling pleasantly and making a little bow) ‘kalos orisate’ 
[welcome].” (Livanios, The Macedonian Question, p. 25).
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international and regional sources. Secondly, certain significant implications 
for the eventual emergence of a Slav-Macedonian national identity ensue 
from it: the identity comes to the forefront much later than the other Balkan 
ones and is therefore perceived as much weaker and more malleable. 
The central event that possibly signifies the opening chapter of the modern 
Macedonian Question was the creation in 1870 of the Bulgarian Exarchate.9 
It unleashed competing nationalisms and an often armed antagonism for 
securing or protecting the national affiliation of the Slavophone residents 
in Macedonia. For mainstream Greek scholars, Slav-Macedonian identity 
comes to the forefront as an intellectual and political force only within this 
context and at the very end of the nineteenth century and primarily in the 
beginning of the twentieth. 
The connections with the Bulgarian national movement are of paramount 
importance:
It is inappropriate to speak of two separate rival national movements 
– the Bulgarian and the Macedonian – in the European provinces 
of the Ottoman Empire. It was a matter of two wings within the 
same movement. For the activists it was perfectly normal to change 
sides, and it is no coincidence that both Bulgarian and Macedonian 
historiography today lay claim to the same tradition in the national 
liberation struggle. Both venerate the same heroes and legends.10
In this second stage of Slav-Macedonian identity development, it is the 
understanding of mainstream Greek scholars that towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, the majority of Bulgarians were convinced that the 
Slavophone peasants residing in Ottoman Macedonia were essentially co-
nationals who should eventually be incorporated within a “Greater Bulgaria”. 
Gradually, some Bulgarians came to the realization that the interests of the 
era’s Great European Powers, as well as the regional powers of Greece and 
9 On the creation of the Exarchate, see Thomas A. Meininger, Ignatiev and the 
Establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, 1864-1872, Madison: The State Historical 
Society of Wisconsin for the Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 1970. See 
also Evangelos Kofos, The Macedonian Question: The Politics of Mutation, Thessaloniki: 
Institute for Balkan Studies, 1987, p. 1, and Livanios, The Macedonian Question, pp. 16-17.
10 Fikret Adanir, “The Macedonians in the Ottoman Empire, 1878-1912”, in The 
Formation of National Elites, ed. Andreas Keppeler in collaboration with Fikret Adanir 
and Alan O’Day, Dartmouth: New York University Press (Comparative Studies on 
Governments and Non-dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940, Vol. VI), 1992, 
p. 161.
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Serbia, excluded such an outcome. From a Bulgarian perspective, and in 
order to ensure that Ottoman Macedonia would not be “carved up” by all the 
neighbouring Balkan states, a movement in favour of political separatism was 
advanced. The goal was the political autonomy of Ottoman Macedonia and 
not its incorporation into Bulgaria, although such a development was not 
necessarily precluded for a later date.
The Bulgarian political separatist movement was not solely based on a 
“reading” of the existing regional balance of power. It was also the result of 
the dissatisfaction of local Slavophones with the policy preferences of the 
official Bulgarian State on language, ecclesiastical and foreign policy issues. 
Separatism delinked the immediate political future of Ottoman Macedonia 
with that of Bulgaria, without, at first, accepting the existence of a different 
“Macedonian” national identity. In a sense, the movement appeared as an 
intra-Bulgarian differentiation on strategic goals. However, it was quickly 
followed by an ethnic separatist movement that proclaimed a “Macedonian” 
nation that was to be clearly and irrevocably distinguished from the Bulgarian 
and Serbian nations.11 In this process, Greeks acknowledge particularly 
the role of Krste Petkov Misirkov and a few like-minded intellectuals. 
Misirkov’s Macedonian Affairs (1903) is usually presented, and the author’s 
inconsistencies concerning his own self-declared national affiliation duly 
and unfailingly noted.12 Misirkov seems to have been acutely aware that 
his claims constituted a relatively new development, something with which 
most Greeks are in agreement. He explained: “Here is what one can answer to 
those who claim that a Macedonian nationality never existed: it might have 
not existed but today it exists and it will exist in the future.”13 
11 For a comprehensive and near-definitive study of the creation of the Macedonian 
political and ethnic separatist movements, from a Greek perspective, see Anna 
Aggelopoulou, Ο Κ. Π. Μισιρκόφ (1874-1926) και η κίνηση των “Μακεδονιστών” [K. P. 
Misirkov (1874-1926) and the “Macedonianist” movement], Thessaloniki: University 
Studio Press, 2004. 
12 See Livanios, The Macedonian Question, pp. 14-15. For an excellent discussion 
of Misirkov and his intellectual fellow-travellers, see Spyridon Sfetas, Η διαμόρφωση 
της σλαβομακεδονικής ταυτότητας. Μια επώδυνη διαδικασία [The shaping of the Slav-
Macedonian identity: a painful process], Thessaloniki: Vanias, 2003, pp. 46-90. 
13 Krste Misirkov, Μακεδονικές υποθέσεις [Macedonian affairs], transl. Dimitris 
Karagiannis, Athens: Petsiva Publications, 2003, p. 138; my translation. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 04:37:47 |
220 Aristotle Tziampiris 
Livanios both expands and qualifies the scope of those accepting the existence 
of such a national identity:
Misirkov and the small circle of intellectuals who professed a 
Macedonian consciousness, however inconsistently, were not the 
only source of Macedonianism. Serbian politicians and scholars…
also acknowledged at about the same time the existence of a separate 
Macedonian group, but they did so in an attempt to deny those Slavs to 
Bulgarian nationalism, thus safeguarding the “historic rights” of Serbia 
in the region.14
Within this context, Greek scholars invariably conclude that the August 1903 
Ilinden events constituted an uprising and not a revolution, while they deny 
that it had a purely or even predominantly Slav-Macedonian character. In 
doing so, it becomes possible to dismiss its subsequent nationalist use by 
FYROM: “The ‘Ilinden Revolt’…became one of the most potent foundation 
myths of Macedonian nationalism which considered the uprising, as it 
still does, as the most significant manifestation of Macedonian national 
consciousness.”15
For mainstream Greek historiography, a Slav-Macedonian identity had 
nevertheless emerged by the beginning of the twentieth century. It was 
closely connected to and essentially derivative of the Bulgarian identity and 
endorsed by some Serbians for reasons pertaining to their country’s perceived 
national interest. Early “Macedonianism” was the weak construct of a small 
intellectual élite lacking widespread popular acceptance.
In the decades leading up to World War II, Greeks stress the limited dis-
semination of the Slav-Macedonian identity. For example, it has been pointed 
out that in 1928, “There were only 81,984 Slavophones [in Greece]…a large 
number of [whom] continued to have a Bulgarian [e.g. non-“Macedonian”] 
consciousness.”16 Taking full advantage of extensive research in British 
archives, Dimitris Livanios presents a 1925 Foreign Office memorandum, 
according to which, “The majority of the Slavs [in Macedonia]…do not care 
to what nationality they belong.” Five years later, a subsequent memorandum 
noted that “a large part of the inhabitants of Macedonia do not have any 
14 Livanios, The Macedonian Question, p. 15.
15 Ibid., p. 19; my emphasis. See also Evangelos Kofos, Nationalism and Communism 
in Macedonia, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1964, p. 33.
16 Kofos, Nationalism and Communism, p. 48. Kofos follows the results of the 1928 
Greek census.
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particular national aspiration”.17 It is thus not surprising that “the Foreign 
Office came to the conclusion that Macedonia was a national ‘no man’s land’, 
‘just like Alsace: one of those parts of Europe which has no real nationality’”; 
while “the Macedonian Question [is] a ‘sleeping dog’ which should be allowed 
to lie at all costs”.18
This proved impossible due to the momentous regional events of the 1940s. 
In fact, as far as Greek historiography is concerned, that decade holds the key 
to understanding the shaping and acceptance of a Slav-Macedonian identity 
by many of the Slavophones residing in Yugoslavia and Greece. There are two 
reasons for this: first, the existence of an armed national “Macedonianist” 
liberation movement and, second, the creation of the People’s (subsequent 
Socialist) Republic of Macedonia (PRM). It is almost an article of faith that 
both were primarily, if not exclusively, connected to the regional geopolitical 
ambitions of Marshall Josip Broz (nom du guerre Tito) to create a Balkan 
Communist Federation (controlled by him) that would include the Greek 
port city of Thessaloniki and hence access to the Aegean Sea.19
According to this interpretation of events, the Nazi occupation of the Balkans 
(and subsequent Greek Civil War) presented options and necessitated 
choices for the Slavophones in geographic Macedonia, even among those 
who had a weak (if any) national identity.20 Thus, some fought for their Greek 
or Bulgarian identities, while others collaborated with the Nazis or switched 
17 Ibid.
18 Livanios, The Macedonian Question, pp. 66 and 78.
19 See, for example, N. I. Mertzos, Εμείς οι Μακεδόνες [We the Macedonians], Athens: 
I. Sideris, 1992, pp. 354-402. The Foreign Office was fully aware and very apprehensive of 
the potential territorial implications in the Balkans of the Greater Macedonia irredentism 
connected to Tito’s policies. See Livanios, The Macedonian Question, pp. 165 and 173.
20 In this sense, the findings of the British officer P. H. Evans, which were included in a 
1943 report following his mission to Greek Macedonia, are not necessarily troubling from 
a Greek perspective. That they contrast with the Foreign Office conclusions of 18 and 13 
years previously could perhaps be the result of the choices that the local Slavophones were 
essentially forced to make by the 1940s. For example, Evans notes that, “It is…important 
to emphasize that the inhabitants, just as they are not Greeks, are also not Bulgarians, or 
Serbs or Croats. They are Macedonians…The Macedonians are actuated by strong but 
mixed feelings of patriotism…[Their] patriotism is not artificial.” Cited in Andrew Rossos, 
Macedonia and the Macedonians: A History, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2008, p. 
90; my emphasis.
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sides. Many, though, were lured by Tito and his policies on Yugoslavia’s 
nationalities.
Tito and his top aide, Svetozar Vukmanović (nom du guerre Tempo), 
ultimately succeeded in significantly reducing any previous or lingering pro-
Bulgarian sympathies.21 This was achieved through a number of policies, 
such as the creation of the Communist Party of Macedonia (CPM – its name 
being significant and indicative of intentions). The party’s armed units 
also contributed to the “‘Macedonianization’ of the Macedonians [since] it 
practised the politics of integration by including in its rank and file men of 
all inclinations”.22 
Furthermore, the Anti-Fascist Council of the National Liberation of 
Yugoslavia issued a significant resolution on 29 November 1943, explaining 
that “Yugoslavia is being built up on a federal principle which will ensure full 
equality for the nations of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro 
[and] Bosnia-Herzegovina.”23 In addition, the Anti-Fascist Assembly of 
the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) was created in 1944. A 
proclamation issued on 4 August of that year is indicative of its irredentist 
goals and nationalist ideology:
People of Macedonia! 
In the course of three years of combat you have achieved your unity, 
developed your army and laid the basis for the federal Macedonian 
state. With the participation of the entire Macedonian nation in the 
struggle against the Fascist occupiers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and 
Greece you will achieve unification of all parts of Macedonia, divided 
in 1915 and 1918 by Balkan imperialists.24
At that point Tito was unable to unite all of geographic Macedonia under his 
aegis, a project that would remain unrealized. However, he did proceed to 
create in 1944 the PRM as part of the Yugoslav Federation.25 For most Greek 
scholars, the foundational cultural policies pursued by this republic explain 
21 See Livanios, The Macedonian Question, p. 119.
22 Ibid., p. 125.
23 Cited in Kofos, Nationalism and Communism, p. 117; my emphasis.
24 Cited in Hugh Poulton, Who Are the Macedonians?, London: Hurst and Company, 
1995, p. 106; my emphasis.
25 Irredentist claims were public and of central importance at the founding of the 
federal republic. See Kofos, Nationalism and Communism, p. 136.
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the construction and particular content of the modern Slav-Macedonian 
identity and “newly found nationalism”:26 
The encouragement and evolution of Macedonian culture has had a 
far greater and more permanent impact on Macedonian nationalism 
than has any other aspect of Yugoslav policy…The greatest cultural 
effect has come from the creation of the Macedonian language and 
literature, the new Macedonian national interpretation of history, and 
the establishment of a Macedonian Orthodox Church.27
Livanios follows this framework and partakes in the general critical outlook 
of the republic’s cultural policies.28 He presents, though, an additional and 
moderately revisionist argument, claiming that it helps explain the shaping 
of the latest manifestation of Slav-Macedonian national ideology. In doing 
so, he both deviates from the standard Greek historiographical approach and 
at the same time attempts to enrich it.
Livanios accepts that Tito created the overall political framework and set the 
general strategic goals of federal Yugoslavia but allowed the CPM considerable 
local autonomy in setting the cultural, linguistic, nationalistic and identity-
related policies of the PRM.29 These policies did not merely attempt to 
confront Bulgarian and Greek nationalism, but, even more significantly, were 
infused by an acute local anti-Serbianism. The Foreign Office had stressed 
such feelings since at least 1930, noting that the Serbs in the Yugoslav region 
of Macedonia were considered “invaders and unwelcome foreigners”.30 
During the period between the two World Wars, anti-Serbianism “took 
the form of Bulgarophilia. In the post-war [era] it was transformed into 
Macedonianism.”31 The PRM’s new educational system fully reflected these 
feelings, while Serbs were essentially unwelcome as civil servants.32 In fact, 
26 Livanios, The Macedonian Question, p. 192; my emphasis.
27 Stephen E. Palmer, Jr, and Robert R. King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian 
Question, Hamden: Archon Books, 1971, p. 154.
28 See Livanios, The Macedonian Question, pp. 185, 193-194 and 198-200. 
29 See ibid., p. 203.
30 The 1930 Foreign Office report is cited in ibid., p. 66. In fact, Livanios stresses that 
“some thirty years of Serbian rule were enough to create an anti-Serbian sentiment of 
which many Bulgarian propagandists would be jealous” (Livanios, The Macedonian 
Question, p. 178). 
31 Ibid., p. 205.
32 See ibid., pp. 193-194. 
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the CPM even refused to accept “Serb technical advisers in…reconstruction 
planning”.33
Ultimately for Livanios, the cultural and political actions based on anti-
Serbian animus reduce (but not negate) Tito’s role in the creation of 
“Macedonianism” in the 1940s:
It is not convincing to suggest that Tito communicates the Macedonian 
virus to the Macedonians in 1944, for shortly afterwards he was 
confronted with an epidemic. Moreover, Macedonian nationalism 
– as it was expressed in 1944-7 – had too strong an anti-Yugoslav 
dimension to be to his liking…Tito and the CPY [Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia] had been instrumental in the consolidation of 
[Macedonianism] but it quickly acquired its own dynamics, set its 
own dimension, and, at the local level, served local needs, not always 
compatible with those of Tito and Yugoslavia.34 
It should be kept in mind that Tito was not a liberal democratic leader 
subject to regular free elections.35 He was a communist autocrat holding 
supreme power over federal Yugoslavia until his death. The magnitude of 
Tito’s power proved sufficient to overcome even the split with Stalin and 
the Soviet Union. To suggest that Tito would have not attempted to reverse 
policies that he strongly disliked and disapproved of is not entirely credible. 
If such policies served his wider geopolitical goals and were perceived merely 
as a mild irritant to his power and domestic political arrangements, then 
it becomes comprehensible how and why he might have allowed them to 
be implemented. In other words, Tito’s role in the creation of the modern 
version of “Macedonianism” is perhaps somewhat less significant than the 
one ascribed to him by Greek historiography but still of great impact. 
Based on the above, it can be concluded that a mainstream Greek narrative 
on the development of Slav-Macedonian identity has gradually emerged, 
striving to comprehend and explain all of its major stages of development. This 
account is, of course, far from uniform, but most scholars share a common 
“road map” by focusing on particular events, documents and turning points. 
33 See ibid., p. 197.
34 Ibid., pp. 204 and 206.
35 On Tito, see Stephan K. Pavlowitch, Tito: Yugoslavia’s Great Dictator, London: C. 
Hurst and Company, 1992; Jasper Ridley, Tito: A Biography, London: Constable, 1994; 
and Richard West, Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 
1994.
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The explanatory framework that results has often been challenged, as befits 
a controversial and often politicized academic topic.36 However, when high 
emotions and hidden agendas are excluded, it still remains possible to enrich 
and contribute towards the understanding and debate of various aspects of 
the Macedonian Question. Livanios’ analysis of the Slav-Macedonian anti-
Serbian feelings in explaining Tito’s role in the cultural policies and identity 
formation taking place in the People’s Republic of Macedonia represents 
precisely such an example.37
University of Piraeus Aristotle Tziampiris
36 See, for example, Anastasia N. Karakasidou, Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages 
to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997; 
id., “Politicizing Culture: Negating Ethnic Identity in Greek Macedonia”, Journal of 
Modern Greek Studies XI (1993), pp. 1-28; Tasos Kostopoulos, Η απαγορευμένη γλώσσα. 
Κρατική καταστολή των σλαβικών διαλέκτων στην ελληνική Μακεδονία [The forbidden 
language: state suppression of Slavic dialects in Greek Macedonia], Athens: Black List, 
2000; and Dimitris Lithoxoou, Ελληνικός αντιμακεδονικός αγώνας. Από το Ίλιντεν στη 
Ζαγκορίτσανη (1903-1905) [The Greek anti-Macedonian struggle: from Ilinden to 
Zagoritsani (1903-1905)], Athens: Megali Poreia, 1998. 
37 The next stage for Greek historiography will be to understand the latest “mutation” 
of “Macedonianism” that is integrally related to FYROM’s recent, official and wide-ranging 
“Antiquization” campaign. See Anastas Vangeli, “Nation-building Ancient Macedonian 
Style: The Origins and the Effects of the So-called Antiquization in Macedonia”, 
Nationalities Papers XXXIX/1 (2011), pp. 13-32.
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